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Defending Empire at the United Nations: The Politics of
International Colonial Oversight in the Era of
Decolonisation
Jessica Lynne Pearson
Macalester College, St. Paul, USA
ABSTRACT
This article argues that, although anti-colonial delegations to
the 1945 San Francisco Conference did not succeed in bringing
all colonial territories under the umbrella of international
trusteeship, the threat of expanding international oversight
shaped the relationship between colonial governments and
international organisations in powerful ways. By focusing on
how the UN Special Committee on Non-Self-Governing
Territories evolved as a de facto supervisory system for
dependent territories, this article considers the ways that
representatives at the United Nations defined dependency
and self-government and explores the crusade that colonial
governments led to justify imperialism in the post-war world.
Through a consideration of the diplomatic actions of France,
Great Britain and Belgium, this article explores the ways that
colonial empires jointly mobilised to defend colonialism at
the level of the United Nations. In the face of evolving
supervisory mechanisms at the United Nations, the French,
British and Belgian delegations joined forces in an attempt to
expose some of the inherent contradictions in UN policy
towards dependent populations, and to make the case that
subject populations living in independent territories often
endured worse conditions than those living in formal
overseas empires.
Keywords
Colonialism; decolonization;
United Nations; international
organizations; non-self-
governing territories
‘Colonial’ questions are becoming more and more important in international affairs. In
many cases ‘anti-colonialism’ is merely a cover for intense racial feeling, a colour preju-
dice in reverse which reflects the resentment of the darker peoples against the past
domination of the world by European nations. In all cases ‘anti-colonialism’ is
based on emotion rather than on reason, on misconceptions instead of a correct
appraisal of the facts. (Sir Alan Burns, In Defence of Colonies, 1957)
In the introduction to his 1957 treatise In Defence of Colonies, Sir Alan Burns,
the former British representative to the United Nations Trusteeship Council,
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lambasted the United Nations for the role he believed it played as a forum for
international anti-colonial manoeuvrings. Burns, who had spent 42 years of
his career in the British Colonial Service, claimed that much of the negative
press that colonial empires had generated in the post-war period was a result
of a lack of understanding about conditions in those territories and about the
conditions in independent countries in the developing world. According to
Burns, ‘the subject people living in the British Empire have greater liberty and
better conditions of living than many of the inhabitants of independent
countries’. He argued that ‘the severest criticisms of “colonialism” come from
the representatives of nations whose treatment of indigenous peoples is deplor-
able, and whose governments are the most notorious for tyranny, inefficiency, or
corruption.’ While Burns characterised himself as an avid supporter of many
UN projects in the 1950s, he argued that, when it came overseeing colonial gov-
ernance, the organisation had done much more harm than good. The UN, he
believed, had become a privileged space for anti-colonial parties to express
and agitate on behalf of fundamentally misinformed views.1
Burns was not alone in his scathing indictment of the United Nations and the
role that many anti-colonial delegations hoped it would play in precipitating the
end of colonialism in the post-war period. His book was reflective of broader fear
among colonial administrators that the UN would prove to be a key instigator of
empire’s undoing, especially when coupled with the threat of nationalist move-
ments within the colonies themselves. In a 1950 report, for example, one French
colonial administrator wrote that the French now found ‘themselves to be sim-
ultaneously in a position of judge and defendant before the tribunal that is the
United Nations, defending a project of which those participating know very little
concerning the conditions and merits’.2 In 1954, Belgium’s ambassador to the
United Nations, Fernand van Langenhove, penned his own denunciation of
what he considered to be the UN’s discriminatory policies towards colonial ter-
ritories. In The Questions of Aborigines before the United Nations: The Belgian
Thesis, van Langenhove accused the United Nations of unjustly criticising the
treatment of dependent peoples in ‘non-self-governing’ (colonial) territories,
while exempting independent countries from the same level of scrutiny.3
Much of the disparagement put forth by colonial governments amounted to
little more than off-colour remarks, like Burns’ assertion that petition-writing
to the Trusteeship Council had become ‘a national sport in tropical Africa’.4
Some of their criticisms, however, pointed to very real shortcomings in the
UN apparatus for protecting dependent peoples living in territories not under
colonial rule.
This article explores the narrow path that European empires navigated
between a growing commitment to internationalism in the post-1945 period
and an attempt to maintain colonial autonomy in the face of evolving supervi-
sion by the United Nations and the broader global community. It explores the
fears and uncertainties surrounding the role that the UN would come to play
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in the unravelling of European colonial empires and argues that the Special
Committee served as a privileged forum for both colonial and anti-colonial del-
egations to the UN to engage in a 15-year battle over who had the right to speak
on behalf of colonial populations on the international stage. While the earliest
studies of decolonisation centred on the role that nationalist movements
within colonial territories played in toppling imperial rule, more recent scholar-
ship has attempted to look beyond the binary of colony/metropole to ground the
end of empire in the broader history of internationalism and international insti-
tutions in the twentieth century.5
Much of this recent scholarship has focused on the way that the international
community dealt with the League of Nations mandates—and, later, the UN
Trust Territories, the colonies that were inherited from the vanquished
nations in the First and Second World Wars. Works by historians such as
Susan Pedersen and Meredith Terretta, among others, trace the slow evolution
of international colonial oversight for this select set of colonial territories. In her
recent global history of the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commis-
sion (PMC), Pedersen argues that the PMC served as an important international
forum for discussions about the rights and responsibilities of European govern-
ments vis-à-vis their colonial populations. But, as Pedersen explains, the interna-
tionalisation of colonialism did not necessarily indicate a growing commitment
to anti-imperialism. Rather, many representatives to the PMC advocated on
behalf of empire, rather than on behalf of the rights of local populations.
While the Mandates Commission did provide an avenue of communication
between the League and people living under colonial rule in the mandated ter-
ritories, the benefits that this forum conferred were tenuous at best. Sometimes
the mandates system, Pedersen argues, actually made colonial rule worse. Mark
Mazower, in his work on the United Nations and colonialism, similarly warns
against reading too much optimism back into the potential of the UN to serve
as an advocate for the world’s most oppressed and downtrodden. Through his
exploration of the role that characters like South African statesman Jan Smuts
played in the creation of the UN, Mazower aims to show the ways that many
people in the postwar era saw the UN—like the League—as a way to preserve
empire, not to dismantle it.6
But, if certain politicians, journalists and activists were pessimistic about the
possibility that the UN would come to play a decisive role in shepherding
dependent territories into a new era of normative statehood, many represen-
tatives from colonial governments feared that the vague wording of the United
Nations Charter had in fact created an notable loophole for delegations from
independent nations in the global south to advocate on behalf of still-
colonised territories in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The debate
between colonial governments and the ‘anti-colonial bloc’ focused on
chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, the ‘Declaration Regarding Non-
Self-Governing Territories’. According to one UN publication, this chapter
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was to be the ‘first international declaration of principle for all dependent ter-
ritories of the world’.7 Short of establishing an official system of international
supervision for colonial territories—akin to the system that the UN Trustee-
ship Council provided for international trust territories—it laid the foundation
for an unofficial structure for international oversight. The most seemingly
benign element of chapter XI was article 73(e), which stipulated that colonial
governments would provide regular reports on conditions in their colonies. It
was this article, however, that became the subject of some of the most acrimo-
nious debates and the body that was eventually created to process those
reports—the UN Special Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing
Territories—would ultimately become an important battleground for the clash
over the fate of empire that would unfold in the United Nations over the
course of several decades.8
Article 73: A Sacred Trust or a Legal Obligation?
Before the delegates from the 50 ‘united nations’ met in San Francisco in April
of 1945 to draft the charter of the new United Nations Organization, represen-
tatives from a select number of interested nations had gathered to discuss the
transfer of the League of Nations Mandates system to the UN, and the poss-
ible role that the new organisation could eventually play in overseeing all colo-
nial territories. If certain, more self-assured, representatives like Jan Smuts had
no reservations about the role that the new United Nations Organization
could play in keeping the world safe for empire, other delegates to the
San Francisco conference were less confident about their ability to guarantee
their sovereignty in their overseas territories in the face of possible inter-
national ‘interference’. The French delegation, for its part, worried about
mounting criticism of France’s imperial system from both the Soviet and
the American press, and went as far as to state in its official position paper
on the eve of the conference that, when it came to the French empire, ‘at
San Francisco, France is gambling its definitive fate’. French officials feared
that they might be pressured by the American government to give up all of
their overseas territories, or that the principle of trusteeship might be
applied to all colonies, rather than just the mandated territories that the
UN would inherit from the League of Nations.9
In February 1945, an article in The American Mercury by Geneva—‘a pseudo-
nym of a specialist in international affairs…whose present relations with Euro-
pean governments will not permit him to write under his own name’—outlined a
model for this new international system of colonial oversight. While the League’s
mandates system applied only to a select group of colonial territories—the rem-
nants of the German and Ottoman empires—Geneva proposed a system in
which all colonial territories could potentially be brought under the umbrella
of international trusteeship. According to the article,
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There is no reason why the principle of international supervision should be confined to
the former mandates of the League… Imperialism is imperialism whether it is old or
new, and the daily routine violence necessary to maintain old tyrannies is almost as
inexcusable as new aggression.10
It was this potential extension of the mandates system to all colonial terri-
tories that French officials feared the most.11
The delegations to the San Francisco Conference straddled the line between
advancing the internationalisation of imperial governance and refusing to take
a definitive stand on the colonial question altogether. The result was a document
whose commitment to decolonisation was, at best, ambiguous. Chapters XII and
XIII of the charter—based on an American draft proposal—focused on the role
that the Trusteeship Council would play in governing UN Trust Territories,
while chapter XI outlined a list of general guidelines for the governance of
those colonial territories that did not fall under the umbrella of UN Trusteeship.
According to this chapter, which was based on a British draft proposal,
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the admin-
istration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-gov-
ernment recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories
are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost…
the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories.
To ensure this commitment to people in non-self-governing territories, member
states with colonies, or administering members, agreed to ensure ‘their political,
economic, social advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against
abuses’. They also promised to ‘develop self-government’ and to ‘take due
account of the political aspirations of the peoples’, and committed to
‘promote constructive means of development, to encourage research, and to
cooperation with one another and…with specialized international bodies’.12
In order to ensure that colonial governments were keeping their promises of
good governance, article 73(e) obligated them to ‘transmit regularly to the Sec-
retary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security
and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information
of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and education conditions in
the territories’.13 While the concept of reporting on conditions in colonial terri-
tories was not new, it had been previously employed only for the mandates ter-
ritories under the League’s system, and was now to be applied on a much wider
scale.14 While the new requirement to submit information was unsettling to
some of the colonial delegations to the conference, many officials took
comfort from the fact that, in their view, this ‘Declaration’ was to operate
merely as a set of guidelines. According to the authors of a 1948 publication
entitled What the United Nations is Doing for Non-Self-Governing Territories,
the purpose of these reports was to provide the United Nations with ‘a factual
basis for keeping informed on the well-being and advancement of peoples of
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its Member states’. This was to be a system of ‘international accountability’,
which the authors contrasted with the system of ‘international supervision’
that had been instituted by the Trusteeship Council.15
Some interpreters of the charter, however, hewed more closely to the view
that this represented a contractual obligation to the international community,
and not one that could be subject to the various interpretations of individual
colonial governments. In his 1949 study, Non-Autonomous Territories and the
United Nations Charter, French legal scholar André Mathiot took up the ques-
tion of the nature of France’s obligation under article 73. As Mathiot explained,
the confusion over whether the requirement to submit information on behalf of
non-self-governing territories was ‘juridical’ in nature, ‘or simply moral’, was a
function of the unclear terms of the charter itself. For Mathiot, the requirements
set forth in article 73(e) represented a legal contract. He reminded his readers
that, according to article 73, ‘the Members of the United Nations accept the obli-
gation… to assure the progress of dependent populations’. This, he explained, ‘is
the language of law. This is not a case of moral duty or a simple declaration of
good intentions. The [colonial] powers… have made a commitment vis-à-vis
International Society.’16
If the provisions of article 73 were not in fact a legal obligation, argued the
Philippines representative to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly
in 1946, the framers would not have bothered including chapter XI at all. Pro-
ponents of a more rigid interpretation of article 73(e) argued that the obligation
to transmit information about colonial conditions was not only a legal one, but
also necessary in order to ensure that administering members were in fact
upholding the obligations set forth in the rest of the chapter. In later years
anti-colonial delegations such as those hailing from Egypt, India, Indonesia,
the Latin American states and the Soviet Union also advanced the claim that
the Assembly should be endowed with the capacity to offer general recommen-
dations about how administering members could best fulfil these obligations.17
The colonial delegations to the UN—not surprisingly—took a very different
approach. They argued that by omitting a stipulation for a body responsible
for administering non-trust dependent territories, the framers of the charter
were explicitly rejecting the creation of a supervisory role for the UN in colonial
territories that did not fall under the purview of international trusteeship.
Nothing in the UN Charter, argued representatives from the French Ministry
of Affairs, gave the UN ‘a right of visibility’ into the inner workings of dependent
territories.18 Moreover, they argued, dependent territories figured squarely in the
internal affairs of the metropolitan government, in which article 2(7) of the
charter prohibited the UN from interfering.19
According to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the insidious extension
of UN jurisdiction in matters relating to dependent territories constituted a
mission of revenge by the newly independent states like India and Indonesia.
One official wrote: ‘These newcomers, once under the dependence of the
530 J. L. PEARSON
West… have a double preoccupation: to assure themselves the role of judge
before our accused and uneasy civilizations’ and ‘to boast of their own
modern and innovative spirit in the face of our old, outmoded system’. The
goal, he wrote, was both to ‘humiliate their old masters’ and to ‘deprive them
of what remained of their overseas possessions’.20 French officials also saw the
slow extension of the UN’s role in colonial matters as retaliation for anti-
colonialists’ failure at San Francisco to bring all dependent territories under
the umbrella of international trusteeship. An internal report from the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that the ‘real goal, if unstated,’ of the
recommendations proposed by the Special Committee on Non-Self-Governing
Territories was to create ‘a system of control comparable, mutatis mutandis,
to the system that the Charter had created for territories that fell under the
regime of international trusteeship’.21
Others within the French administration unequivocally denied the relevance
of the legal debate, stating that under no circumstances could the territories of
the French Union be considered to be non-self-governing. In a letter from the
Ministry of Overseas France to all of the high commissioners of France’s terri-
tories, Technical Commissioner Daniel Pepy wrote on behalf of the minister in
1952 that he had asked the members of the French delegation to the Special
Committee to remind the other members ‘that our overseas territories are an
integral part of the French Republic… and that they participate in the exercise
of national sovereignty’. Pepy then noted that, ‘if we continue to provide to the
UN information stipulated by article 73(e) of the charter, it is out of pure cour-
tesy and not to satisfy any international obligation’.22 These views were echoed
by the British and Belgian delegations, which had similar reservations about the
constitutionality of the committee’s work.23
Negotiating Oversight at the United Nations
As the debate about the legal nature of the charter’s requirements dragged on,
proponents of a more literal reading of chapter XI began to work on the estab-
lishment of a body to implement its provisions, a body that colonial representa-
tives would fight each step of the way. Because the charter made no stipulations
regarding the way the data should be collected or what could be done with it, it
fell to the General Assembly to convene a special group that would be charged
with the task of thinking through the practical questions.24 For example, how
could information be collected in a way that would facilitate comparisons
between territories under different colonial administrations and in different
geographic locations? What could the secretary general do with the information
that was collected? What sort of recommendations was the General Assembly
able to establish based on the information collected? Other questions were
more political in nature and thus more contested by representatives from colo-
nial governments: under whose jurisdiction did it fall to decide which territories
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were self-governing and which were not? What criteria should be used? And, if
information on political participation was not required under the charter, could
the General Assembly encourage states to submit this information voluntarily?
To address these questions, the General Assembly elected to form an ad hoc
committee for the years 1946–47, and then replaced this body with the Special
Committee on Information Transmitted under article 73(e) of the charter, which
had a one-year term.25 The committee, which met for the first time in Paris in
September of 1948, was made up of 16 member states of the United Nations: the
eight members that held colonial territories and a rotating cast of eight ‘non-
administering’ members.26 The committee was assigned the task of examining
‘the information transmitted… on the economic, social and educational con-
ditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories’ and submitting ‘reports
thereon for the consideration of the General Assembly with such procedural rec-
ommendations as it may deem fit, and with such substantive recommendations
as it may deem desirable relating to the functional fields generally, but not with
respect to individual territories.’27
While the committee’s assignment seemed relatively benign, from its first ses-
sions some representatives attempted to push its work beyond its mandate of
reviewing reports and submitting general recommendations to the UN
General Assembly, prompting representatives from colonial governments to
fear that the committee was indeed taking on a life of its own, outside the
bounds of what was outlined in the charter. According to a 1956 report from
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the hands of ‘states hostile to all
forms of dependence and in favour of the complete emancipation of all terri-
tories under the administration of another power’, the UN Special Committee
rapidly expanded its involvement in colonial politics during the first few years
of its existence. The resolutions passed, according to the French report, ran
the gamut from those with ‘irritating’ effects for the colonial delegations to
those that ran counter to the stipulations of article 73 of the charter. The
most contentious debates surrounded the creation of a permanent committee,
the transmission of information on political participation and human rights
and the definition of self-government.28
The first question that the ad hoc committee had to confront was the status of
the committee itself. Representatives from the colonial governments had orig-
inally envisioned a temporary body that would deal with the initial questions
of how to collect the information and what to do with it. Pressure from the
anti-colonial faction, however, resulted in a compromise that created a de
facto permanent committee with a sphere of influence that grew with each
passing year. During the first meeting of the Special Committee in 1948, the
Indian and Soviet delegations were adamant about the need to create a perma-
nent committee—with the argument that as long as there were dependent terri-
tories in the world, there would be a need for such a body.29 Representatives
from the colonial governments, however, argued that the creation of a
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permanent committee was unconstitutional, since the UN Charter made no
mention of such a body.30 The Soviet proposal to create a permanent oversight
institution was rejected in favour of renewing the committee’s mandate for
another year. The colonial delegations hoped that within this time frame the
committee’s members could finalise the parameters for collecting information
and agree on a standard intake form that government officials could use.31
The debate continued in 1949 when the Special Committee came up for
renewal and representatives found themselves once again facing the question
of whether the United Nations had the right to create a permanent system of
colonial oversight that had not been anticipated by the organisation’s founders.
The French, British and Belgian delegations favoured the renewal of the commit-
tee for a maximum mandate of one year—in order to finalise the procedures for
information collecting. They reminded their colleagues that analysis of the infor-
mation and policy recommendations were not part of the committee’s mandate.
The Venezuelan delegation countered that it was unlikely that the framers
intended that ‘the information which was transmitted under Article 73(e)
should be hidden away in the archives of the Secretariat’. Representatives
from China, the Soviet Union and India argued that the creation of a permanent
body held a certain psychological importance for people living in colonial terri-
tories, and failing to do so would send the message that the United Nations was
not willing to hold colonial governments accountable for their obligations under
the charter.32
The US delegation took a position between these two extremes and proposed
a committee with a three-year mandate, which would focus on a different sub-
stantive policy area each year: education during the first, economic policy during
the second and social development during the third.33 When the proposal for a
permanent committee was rejected by an eight-to-six vote, the anti-colonial del-
egations lent their support to the American proposal. Although the colonial gov-
ernments had succeeded in preventing the establishment of a permanent
committee, in many ways the Special Committee with a renewable three-year
mandate would come to serve as a de facto system of colonial oversight whose
work resembled that of the UN Trusteeship Council in several important
ways. Although the colonial delegations to the UN had hoped the vague
wording of the charter would protect them from international ‘interference’ in
colonial affairs, the body that emerged from article 73(e) was much larger in
scope than the committee that they had originally envisioned and its semi-per-
manent status would ensure that the inner workings of their empires would
remain accessible to a broad global public on an ongoing and regular basis.34
Collecting Data, Promoting Visibility
If the idea of creating a permanent or semi-permanent committee to oversee
conditions in colonial territories generated a great deal of controversy at the
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UN, so too did the debates about what kinds of information the organisation
would be able to collect. If, for example, the UN was allowed to collect data
on categories like health and economics, could it also gather information
about a colony’s evolution towards self-government or about the prevalence
of human rights abuses? While the UN Trusteeship Council had created a
direct link between the UN and populations in a limited set of colonies, the
only way that dependent populations in non-trust territories could make their
voice heard in an official capacity at the UN was through the data that were
shared on their behalf.
In 1946, governments had the option of submitting any information they
wished about conditions in their colonial territories. The following year, in
1947, the ad hoc committee crafted a standard form that required detailed infor-
mation to be submitted on a wide range of topics related to education, economic
policy and social development. These data ranged from areas as diverse as the
number of fisheries operating in a given territory to the instances of malaria
recorded each year.35 Suggestions by the anti-colonial delegations to expand
the scope of the standard form were met with strong opposition from the
French, Belgian and British delegations. Indeed, one of the most politically
charged questions of the early committeemeetingswaswhether the administering
members should be encouraged to voluntarily submit information regarding pol-
itical participation and human rights in non-self-governing territories. A resol-
ution passed in the second meeting of the General Assembly in 1947 noted that
some states had already included information in this category in their reports
to the secretary general and, given that this information was ‘entirely in confor-
mity with the spirit of Article 73 of the Charter’, it ‘should therefore be duly
noted and encouraged’.36
Representatives from theFrench, British andBelgian governments reminded the
other delegations at the first meeting of the Special Committee that no such infor-
mation was required by the charter, and, as such, their governments were ‘not pre-
pared to discuss political or constitutional matters affecting the relations between
Non-Self-GoverningTerritories and themetropolitan countries, either in theCom-
mittee or any other organ of the United Nations’. The collection or discussion of
such material was—according the colonial delegations—unconstitutional vis-à-
vis the charter, which only called for information on social, economic and edu-
cational policy.37 The collection of this information, they claimed, also violated
the clause of the UN Charter that prohibited the organisation from interfering in
questions of national sovereignty.38 In an internal memo to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the French delegation claimed that a decision to include infor-
mation on human rights in the standard form (and allowing the committee to
discuss such matters) would, ‘without a doubt, have the effect of further opening
up this organism to all possible manoeuvres of anti-colonial demagoguery’.39
While the colonial delegations were fighting against even the voluntary trans-
mission of political information, the Egyptian, Indian and Soviet delegations
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were making the case for the mandatory submission of political data. The Indian
representative noted that information about the political situation in colonial
territories was necessary in order to understand any progress that was being
made in the areas of economic, social and educational policy.40 The Soviet del-
egation went as far as to propose amendments to the committee’s resolutions to
allow it to hear petitions from people in non-self-governing territories, and to
conduct on-site visits, which were both functions performed by the UN Trustee-
ship Council for the territories in its charge. The Soviet representatives also
suggested an amendment that would require states to transmit information on
political conditions and human rights.41
In response to these suggestions, the Australian delegation reminded the non-
administering members that in exchange for the colonial governments’ accep-
tance of the obligation to transmit information, the committee had agreed to
respect the limitations of the charter. The Australian delegation also reminded
them that the charter ‘recognized the full authority of the Administering
Powers and their ability and willingness to carry out the policies of Chapter
XI without the need of supervision’. Still, in an attempt to send a clear
message to people living in colonial territories that the UN was committed to
ensuring their just treatment, the committee passed a resolution stating that
voluntary transmission of political information should be encouraged.42 The
Soviet amendments were all rejected as inadmissible, although the anti-colonial
delegations would continue to push for the inclusion of political information in
subsequent meetings.43
With respect to the question of human rights, in 1951 the committee adopted
a resolution requesting all administering members to submit information on the
status of human rights in their territories, although it was not required. Based on
the recommendations of the sub-committee charged with revising the standard
form, an optional category was officially introduced which included information
such as the participation of indigenous peoples in local government bodies and
the use of technical assistance from the UN and its subsidiary bodies in pursuit
of the goal of social and economic development. The committee also decided
that it would consider the formulation of recommendations on promoting
human rights in the non-self-governing territories.44 In addition to the optional
data on political participation and human rights, the revised standard form
required governments to submit data on economic conditions (including agri-
culture, industry, trade and banking), social development (human rights,
labour, social security and welfare and public health), and education (edu-
cational administration, the structure of the educational system and cultural
institutions). In every aspect of the above categories, the administrations were
asked to demonstrate the participation of indigenous persons in every aspect
of social and economic life.45
The expanding scope of the data that colonial governments were required to
provide to the United Nations was, in the eyes of many government officials, an
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extension of UN jurisdiction that went beyond the bounds of what the charter
had authorised. One French colonial health official bemoaned the ‘inquisitorial
nature’ of the standard form.46 Although the simple transmission of data from
colonial territories to the UN might have paled in comparison to the more
formal channels of oversight that the Trusteeship Council established for inter-
national trust territories, the expansion of UN supervision over all areas of the
dependent world constituted a very real shift in international colonial policy.
For the first time in history, the inner workings of colonial empires were now
subject—in a regular and regulated fashion—to the scrutiny of the broader inter-
national community. Moreover, at a time when the fate of colonialism seemed
increasingly uncertain and newly independent nations were joining the
United Nations in growing numbers, the right of colonial governments to
speak—exclusively—on behalf of colonised peoples felt to many European colo-
nial officials to be in serious jeopardy.
Defining Self-Government and Dependency
Beyond its role in generating important data that could be used in critiquing
colonial rule, the UN Special Committee also quickly became embroiled in
debates about the definition of self-government and the role that the UN
would play as an arbiter of the process of decolonisation. If the goal of providing
data was to demonstrate measurable progress towards self-government, the
charter had left several very important questions unanswered: what was self-gov-
ernment? How did one know when it had been achieved? And who ultimately
was responsible for declaring that the process had been completed: the former
colonial government, representatives from the formerly colonised population
or the broader international community? If the exact nature of self-government
was difficult to define, so too was the definition of dependency. The United
Nations Charter defined dependent territories as those which had ‘not yet
attained a full measure of self-government’, but this definition proved to be a
slippery one as delegates to the UN General Assembly became quickly locked
in a debate about which territories chapter XI of the charter applied to. In
initial discussions, some argued that it was within the jurisdiction of the
General Assembly to enumerate the territories to be included in article 73,
while the colonial delegations claimed that that task fell unquestionably to the
metropolitan governments concerned.47
The question re-surfaced on a continual basis throughout the two decades fol-
lowing the war, as constitutional changes within colonial empires changed the
status of dependent territories within those empires and government officials
took it upon themselves to cease transmitting data to the UN on behalf of
those territories. Over the course of 1948–49, Britain, France and the United
States had ceased to transmit information on behalf of several territories. As a
result, the General Assembly requested that governments transmitting
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information keep the Assembly apprised of any constitutional changes between
dependent territories and metropolitan governments. During that year’s meeting
of the Special Committee, the Egyptian delegation brought up for discussion a
communiqué issued by the French government that stated it was squarely—
and exclusively—within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan government to
determine the constitutional status of a dependent territory.
The Egyptian representative countered that, while this may have been true
prior to the creation of the United Nations, changes in international law follow-
ing the war had instituted the principle of international accountability, whereby
the UN could not abandon its obligations to a dependent territory simply
because the metropolitan government had stopped transmitting information
on its behalf. The Egyptian position was supported by the Soviet delegation,
which proposed a resolution stipulating that no colonial government would
be allowed to stop transmitting information on behalf of a dependent territory
until the Special Committee had had sufficient time to consider the consti-
tutional changes involved, and after it had submitted a recommendation to
the General Assembly that the obligations of article 73 be suspended with
regard to that territory.48
Although the proposal was rejected, in 1951 the General Assembly passed a
resolution granting the Special Committee authorisation to examine criteria
by which such territories could be judged to have attained self-government.
According to the guidelines set out by the committee, there were two means
for a dependent territory to achieve self-government. First, it could integrate
itself (at the request of its people) more closely and on equal footing with the
metropolitan government that had been responsible for its administration.
Second, it could achieve political independence, which would in turn be recog-
nised by the international community as an entity constitutionally separate from
the former administering power.49 The Special Committee proposed a set of
general principles that could be used to establish whether or not a territory
had achieved self-government. These included, but were not limited to, a legal
association with another metropolitan country, a shared language, culture, reli-
gion and ethnicity, the free expression of public opinion in the context of a
democratic political process and universal and equal suffrage. The committee
also emphasised the importance of a sufficiently developed economy and a set
of social and educational policies that would allow a formerly dependent terri-
tory an effective means of self-administration.50 In 1952 the General Assembly
accepted the guidelines created by the Special Committee and ruled that any
cases would be decided on an individual basis using those guidelines.51
As colonial governments confronted the UN’s evolving role in supervising
their dependent territories, they did what they could to redefine the terms of
the debate, both in the Special Committee and in the General Assembly. They
did this by questioning what they saw as the UN Charter’s inherent bias
against formal overseas empires and its failure to protect dependent populations
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in independent territories. In Burns’ 1957 book, he denounced new post-war
imperialism, in both its Soviet and American forms. He condemned what he
called ‘internal colonialism’, a form of rule that he claimed existed both in
Latin America and the United States, wherein ‘an educated minority… controls
the indigenous population’. He cited the case of the Amerindian populations of
Latin America, ruled by those of Spanish descent, as well as that of the Native
Americans in North America. Burns also noted that, in many instances, over-
land empires involved many of the same mechanisms of rule as overseas
empires, noting that ‘the victims of Soviet expansion are certainly less “free”
than the inhabitants of British colonies’.52
Those delegations that condemned overseas empires, argued Burns, had fallen
prey to what he called the ‘Salt Water Fallacy’. This, he explained, citing a 1947
speech by Sir Hilton Poynton, was
the fallacy that whereas expansion by a country over land, and the incorporation of
large areas of territory inhabited by other races and peoples in apparently perfectly
praiseworthy, the extension of one’s jurisdiction over sea is stigmatized in certain quar-
ters as ‘Colonial imperialism’, ‘oppression of subject races’, and so forth.
Returning to the question of colonial sovereignty, Poynton had argued
We recognize Soviet sovereignty over the whole vast area of the Soviet Union, built up
by expansion over land, and forming a single unit. But equally we must insist that the
British Colonial Empire, although split up by intervening oceans, is every bit as much a
single international entity as the Soviet Union.53
Representatives from colonial governments advanced the argument that the
United Nations Charter protected dependent peoples living only in certain
types of territories, thereby abandoning those groups living in territories that
did not fit the ‘traditional’ model of a colonial empire. A 1953 statement by
Joseph Nisot, acting Belgian representative to the General Assembly, called
the interpretation of the term ‘non-self-governing territories’ ‘arbitrary,’ explain-
ing that
the obligations set forth in Chapter XI of the Charter apply to all Territories whose
peoples are not yet completely self-governing. They are scarcely less general than
those which derived from article 23(b) of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
under which members undertook to ‘secure just treatment of the native inhabitants
of territories under their control.’
The result of an overly restrictive interpretation of article 73, he claimed, has
‘been to deprive a large part of these peoples of the international guarantees
which they formerly enjoyed’.54
Pierre Ryckmans, governor of the Belgian Congo and Belgian representative
to the Trusteeship Council, argued in a speech that Belgium’s refusal to partici-
pate in the work of the Special Committee had nothing to do with a desire to
deny the authority of the UN in dependent territories:
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Far from wishing to restrict these principles, we wish on the contrary that they should
be respected in their fullest meaning. Far from defending a restrictive interpretation we
declare ourselves in favour of a wide interpretation in conformity with the humanitar-
ian spirit which should dominate our Organization.55
This claim, which came to be known as the ‘Belgian Thesis’, was undoubtedly
connected to the Belgian government’s desire to shield human rights abuses in
its African colonies from international criticism. But the point the Belgian del-
egation raised about the problem of indigenous populations in independent ter-
ritories is an important and interesting one. Living conditions, according to the
colonial delegations, had nothing to do with a territory’s political status, but
everything to do with its position in broader patterns of development. Burns
argued that
inhabitants of many independent countries—and not only those who live under com-
munist rule—enjoy much less freedom than do those who live in British colonies, less
freedom of speech, of religious belief, of the Press, and less security from arbitrary
arrest and imprisonment.56
Defending Empire in the Cold-War Context
As colonial officials worked to shield their overseas empires from the expanding
scope of international supervision, they carefully manipulated terms like ‘self-
government’ and ‘dependency’ to demonstrate the ways in which the organis-
ation fell short of its own ideals when it came to inequality and violence in
non-colonial contexts. Beyond this effort to redefine the terms of the debate,
representatives from French, British and Belgian colonial and foreign ministries
also engaged their diplomatic connections with the United States to make their
case at the UN. Although these members understood the extent to which anti-
colonialism permeated American public opinion, they also understood that the
US had strategic interests in preserving European empires in Africa. Although
the American representatives to the Trusteeship Council and the Special Com-
mittee were clear about their support for the idea of self-determination, they also
feared that the potential fragmentation of the African continent would leave it
open to the influence of the Soviet Union, a fear that colonial representatives
hoped they could use to their advantage.57
As early as 1948 the US government had attempted to form a coherent pos-
ition on European empires. These early discussions crystallised around the idea
of formulating a ‘colonial policy paper’, an idea proposed by Phillip C. Jessup,
acting chief of the United States Mission to the United Nations. The idea was
passed around the State Department by Dean Rusk, director of the Office of
UN Affairs, and in September of 1948 William L. Yeomans, from the Division
of Dependent Area Affairs, drafted the paper, entitled ‘Summary of United
States Policy on Non-Self-Governing Territories’. Yeoman’s brief report later
became a full policy paper entitled ‘US Policy toward Dependent Areas’.
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As conditions in the Special Committee worsened in 1949 and 1950 and tensions
between administering and non-administering members grew, the need to
articulate a consistent US approach to European overseas empires was becoming
increasingly pressing.58
From the perspective of the American government, the US found itself in the
difficult position of having to navigate a relationship with both its long-term
European allies and the multitude of newly independent states, relationships
that had ‘a significant bearing on US security’.59 Indeed, in the minds of some
colonial administrators, the US—although technically an administering power
itself—posed one of the biggest threats to European empires, especially given
its history and the weight that it carried at the United Nations. An internal
memo from the French Foreign Ministry went as far as to state in 1945 that
‘the colonial problem is one of the only questions… in which the American atti-
tude runs completely contrary to that of France.’60
Both French and American documents emphasised the role that American his-
torical tradition played in shaping the American position on empire. In a 1955
paper on the American attitude towards European colonialism, Benjamin Gerig,
the chief of theDivision ofDependentAreaAffairs for the StateDepartment, wrote:
No true American can fail to thrill as he re-reads the ringing words of the Declaration
of Independence—words which define a philosophy of freedom from alien rule as true
and fresh today as when they were first asserted. These words have reverberated
around the world and have set the goal for millions of people who rightly look to
the United States for leadership in the unceasing struggle for individual and national
freedom.61
The State Department policy paper ‘US Policy Towards Dependent Areas’ had
made a similar claim in 1950, noting that ‘confronted by a colonial issue, the
average American will, as if by instinct, favour the peoples of a colonial power
against their European rulers’.62 French analyses of the foreign press echoed
this interpretation of the origins of American anti-colonialism, stating that ‘the
American people, born of an anti-colonial revolution, are hostile to colonies by
tradition’.63
In the context of the Cold War, however, US fears of Soviet expansion
trumped the American ideological commitment to supporting self-government
in colonial territories, and the result was a surprisingly moderate position
on the recommended timeline for decolonisation. In a 1956 State Department
Bulletin, George Allen, assistant secretary for African Affairs, wrote that
recently even the Soviet Union has begun belatedly to make gestures of cooperation
and assistance toward the underdeveloped countries. While this constitutes an impor-
tant change in Soviet tactics, it remains to be seen whether the change is consistent
with the basic Communist objective of world domination.
While American policy and public opinion supported the eventual end of
formal colonial rule, Allen noted: ‘All of the so-called colonial powers
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represented on the continent of Africa are our friends and allies in the worldwide
contest between the free and Communist worlds.’He and others within the State
Department thus emphasised a cautious and moderately paced progression
toward independence, and helped the colonial powers negotiate a middle
ground in the debates on the UN’s role in Africa and the rest of the colonial
world.64
Despite support from the Americans, however, ultimately the results of this
colonial public relations campaign were somewhat ambiguous. In spite of the
best efforts of colonial governments to fend off assaults from the broader inter-
national community, there was no way to go back to a pre-1945 imperial invisi-
bility. Faced with charges of causing land deterioration, propagating race
discrimination, keeping their populations ‘in conditions of ignorance and
semi-starvation’, the colonial powers faced a reality of the post-war period
that they had not foreseen at the signing of the United Nations Charter—a
force of public opinion so strong that it could make or break the already
tenuous ties between metropole and colony in the postwar period.65 As
Mathiot argued in his text, the shift in international public opinion in the
wake of the war, and the creation of a forum in which to institutionalise that
opinion, created an environment in which colonial peoples ‘reclaim the right
to pursue for themselves, with the world as judge, a policy of emancipation’.66
While the UN could not operate as a colonial tribunal in the strictest meaning
of the term, every aspect of the UN system of collecting information from depen-
dent territories became, in a sense, a moment or a space for judging the political
progression of colonial peoples towards self-sufficiency and, ultimately, towards
self-government.
While the UN Charter, as it was established in 1945, failed to immediately over-
turn the very real structural inequalities in a world that empire had created, it did
produce a significant opening that allowed people across the world to see into
the inner lives of those empires. It established a means to generate a crucial
set of data that would allow anti-colonial delegations to formulate their critiques
of imperial rule, and it opened a space where—if colonial subjects could not
speak on their own behalf—representatives from recently independent nations
and other anti-imperial delegations could attempt to speak for them. Colonial
delegations, especially the French, British and Belgians, watched with great tre-
pidation as this informal system of international colonial supervisions evolved
over a 15-year period from the end of the Second World War to the massive
wave of decolonisation that swept the globe in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The extensive engagement with political questions surrounding the nature of
dependency and self-government that took place in the late 1940s and early
1950s with the UN Special Committee is a testament to the ability of anti-colo-
nial representatives to the United Nations to exploit the ambiguous wording of
the charter in favour of expanding an—albeit unofficial—system of international
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colonial oversight. Although article 2(7) of the charter prohibited the United
Nations from interfering in ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state’, the notion that colonial affairs were not a matter of
inherently international concern was rapidly falling away. The Special Commit-
tee had indeed moved far from its original purpose of refining the procedures for
information collecting. Progress in dependent territories was no longer to be
measured solely in terms of technical advancement by metropolitan govern-
ments. Now it was also judged on the basis of progress towards self-government
by the broader international community, according to new international politi-
cal norms in which colonial rule was increasingly becoming the exception, rather
than the rule. The attainment of self-government was no longer solely a function
of negotiations between colony and metropole. It was now something that
needed to be demonstrated to the international community using criteria deter-
mined by a joint committee comprised of both colonial governments and
imperialism’s staunchest opponents.67
Although the project of preserving empire in a post-1945 world revolved
largely around negotiations between colonial governments and their constitu-
ents in their overseas territories, the colonial question was also very much an
international one in which European empires had to confront changing norms
about the legitimacy of empire. In a 1954 article, the Brazilian ambassador to
the United Nations, Sérgio Armando Frazão, wrote that the founding of the
United Nations in 1945 had been the first step in a process by which ‘the
national concept of colonization began… to surrender to the idea of coloniza-
tion as an international function’.68 But the exact mechanisms by which this
would occur was laid out less clearly in the charter than the system intended
to govern the UN Trust Territories. Just as the system of colonial oversight
evolved in an ad hoc manner, so too did colonial strategies to defend the
European imperial project. In an attempt preserve their sovereignty in their
overseas empires, colonial governments put forth a wide variety of challenges
to the very notions of dependency and self-government, and pointed to the
ways the UN failed to protect marginalised populations living in independent
territories.
As former colonies became independent states and joined the ranks of the
United Nations, the position of colonial governments became increasingly pre-
carious as delegations from the global south found themselves increasingly in a
position to make the violence and structural inequalities inherent in colonial rule
visible to the world. If the trusteeship model could not be universally applied to
all colonial territories, the UN Special Committee could still be made to serve as
an imperial referee, holding colonial governments accountable for their commit-
ment to promote self-government and treat their dependent populations justly.
If there was to be no official channel for colonial populations to make their
voices heard at the UN, anti-colonial delegations to the Special Committee
could make the data speak for them.
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When the colonial delegations left the San Francisco Conference in June of
1945, they departed with a feeling of uneasy reassurance that they had preserved
a world safe for empire. But the debates and tensions about sovereignty, inter-
national oversight and the very nature of dependency and self-government that
were launched at the League of Nations and ultimately codified in the UN
Charter were in fact far from resolved and they would continue to haunt colonial
governments throughout the era of decolonisation. Although the charter did not
mandate the creation of a body that would formally oversee all colonial territories,
the ambiguities in its language created a space where anti-colonial delegations to
the UN could try to institute a different model of accountability, allowing the data
collected by the Special Committee to speak for the injustices being committed by
colonial governments against dependent peoples living in their overseas terri-
tories. Even if the idea of an all-encompassing system of trusteeship failed to
take hold at San Francisco, the notion that the UN could still play an important
role in monitoring colonial governance and guiding dependent peoples towards
normative statehood would have important ramifications for the evolution—
and ultimately demise—of colonial empires in the late 1940s and 1950s.
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